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CORPORATE DEBT
RESTRUCTURINGS IN MEXICO:
FOR FOREIGN CREDITORS, INSOLVENCY LAW
IS ONLY HALF THE STORY

Kimberly D. Krawiec*

Although Eduardo Martinez gave a thorough and insightful
presentation on Mexican insolvency law at today's symposium, it is
important to recognize that a proper understanding of a country's
insolvency procedures can often be attained only by looking beyond the
law to the informal methods and customs which have developed in that
country for dealing with debtors in crisis. This is particularly true in
Mexico today, as the worst recession in that nation's history has left many
Mexican corporations on the brink of financial ruin. Because Mexico's
legal system is often inadequate and ineffective at handling complex
bankruptcy cases, many debtor crises are handled through out-of-court
restructurings. Although out-of-court "workouts" such as these are
common in many countries, including the United States, in Mexico this
restructuring process is dominated by large and powerful Mexican bank
lenders. These banks are often able to exploit the workout process to
negotiate favorable terms for themselves, leaving the growing number of
foreign investors with little or no recovery.
Mexico's devaluation of the peso on December 19, 1994, and the
recession that followed led to significant business problems for many
Mexican companies. Indeed, a number of Mexican corporations with
substantial amounts of debt denominated in foreign currencies are now
facing significant liquidity and leverage problems due to the fall in the
peso's value.' Because many of these firms currently are, or will soon
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become, unable to make the interest payments due under the terms of their
debt obligations, Mexico may be headed for a private sector debt crisis
similar to the one it experienced during the 1980's.2

In Mexico, commercial insolvency is governed by federal law-the
Law of Bankruptcy and Suspension of Payments (Ley de Quiebras y de
Suspension de Pagos, or "LQSP")-which provides for two types of

proceedings:

Liquidation Bankruptcy (Quiebra) and Suspension of

Payments (Suspension de Pagos).3

Liquidation Bankruptcy, which is

similar to a Chapter 7 liquidation under United States bankruptcy law,
contemplates a total liquidation of the debtor's business.4 Suspension of
Payments, like a Chapter 11 proceeding in the United States, is designed
to allow the debtor to restructure its liabilities so that it may continue as
an operating business.5 Unlike a Chapter 11 proceeding, however, a
Suspension of Payments proceeding merely creates a period of time during
which the debtor is excused from paying its obligations and interest accrual
on most debts is temporarily halted. 6 The debtor is not required to
restructure its business operations as would be typical under Chapter 1.7
The LQSP is primarily a debtor-oriented statute which remains
essentially unchanged since its passage in 1943.8 In addition, the law's
ambiguities and uncertainties have often led to inconsistent application by
the courts. 9 For this reason, both debtors and creditors generally prefer an
out-of-court restructuring to formal Liquidation Bankruptcy or Suspension
Regime-RestructuringStrategiesforMexican EurobondDebt, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.

117, 119 (1995). The Mexican corporate sector owed approximately $46 billion in nonpeso denominated debt in late 1995. Id. at 120-21.
2. Anne Schwimmer, U.S. Investors Gear Up for High-Profile Mexican Workouts;
Vultures May Hop In, But lnvestment Banks Want Out, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Mar.

11, 1996, at 10.
3. John A. Barrett Jr., Mexican Insolvency Law, 7 PACE INT'L L. REV. 431, 435
(1995); John E. Rogers & Adrian Z. Arriola, Mexico, Banking Yearbook 1995, INT'L FIN.
L. REV. 161, 161-162 (Supp. Oct. 1995).
4. Darrow, supra note 1, at 125.
5. Barrett, supra note 3, at 453-54.
6. Thomas S. Heather, Mexico's Bankruptcy and Suspension of Payments Law in
DEALING WITH FOREIGN WORKOUTS AND INSOLVENCIES
FOR LENDERS AND INVESTORS 135 (PLI Commercial Law

1993: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES
and Practice Course Handbook

Series No. 671, 1993).
7. Barrett, supra note 3, at 454. For this reason, perhaps, Suspension of Payments
proceedings are not generally successful. It is believed that since 1975, only 30 companies
have effectively restructured under the Suspension of Payments procedure. Id.
8. Id. at 436; Rogers & Arriola, supra note 3, at 161.
9. Barrett, supra note 3, at 436.
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of Payments procedures.'" During the debt crisis of the 1980's, for
example, when nearly $14 billion (US) of Mexican corporate debt was
restructured," nearly all corporate debt restructurings were accomplished
out of court.'" At that time, almost all the foreign debt of Mexican
corporations was held by a relatively small number of large international
banks. 13 During the restructuring negotiations, these international banks,
through advisory committees consisting of both Mexican and US 4counsel,
often acted in concert to secure favorable terms for themselves.
Current restructurings, however, are radically different because a
larger amount of debt is held as Eurobonds by foreign investors. 5 In fact,
holders of internationally placed debt securities have now replaced
international commercial banks as the principal foreign creditors of
Mexican corporations.' 6 Much of the outstanding Eurobond debt will
mature during the next three years: from 1996 through 1998, forty-five
issues are due to mature, totaling nearly $6 billion (US).' 7 Given the
remote possibility of refinancing these bonds as they mature, massive
restructurings are predictable. 8 In fact, investment bankers estimate that
approximately twelve Mexican companies, holding nearly $3 billion (US)
in foreign bonds outstanding, will begin to restructure their outstanding
debt by the end of this year.' 9
Unlike the large bank creditors of the 1980's, the foreign
Eurobondholders are a diverse and geographically dispersed group that
includes off-shore retail investors, insurance companies, pension funds,

10. See generally Craig Torres, Out of the Loop: Mexican Restructuringof Finns' Debt
Often Hurts Foreign Holders, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1996, at A1; Rogers & Arriola, supra

note 3, at 163.
11. Darrow, supra note 1, at 121.
12. Rogers & Arriola supra note 3, at 162.
13. Torres, supra note 10; Darrow, supra note 1, at 121.
14. Id.

15. Rogers & Arriola, supra note 3, at 161. In early 1995, $20 billion (U.S.) in
Mexican Eurobonds was outstanding, of which approximately $13 billion (U.S.) had been
issued by the Mexican private sector. Darrow, supra note 1, at 119 & n.2.
16. Rogers & Arriola, supra note 3, at 161.
17. Darrow, supra note 1, at 120. According to the Weston Group, which recently
published a report regarding pending Mexican corporate restructurings, twelve Mexican
corporate Eurobonds, totaling $1.2 billion (U.S.), are due to mature in 1996. Henry Tricks,
Wave of Restructurings Seen for Mexican Eurobonds, THE REUTER EUR. Bus. REP.,
January 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News/Curnws File.
18. Tricks, supra note 17.
19. Torres, supra note 10.
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mutual funds and financial institutions in the U.S. and abroad. These
parties lack the bargaining power of their Mexican bank predecessors.20
As previously noted, the inefficiency and unpredictability of a formal
bankruptcy proceeding in Mexico forces most debtors to negotiate an outof-court restructuring. Such out-of-court restructurings are common in
many countries, including the United States. However, out-of-court
restructurings in the United States follow a relatively orderly procedure in
which all creditor interests are represented. 2' The workout process in
Mexico, by contrast, is uniquely ad hoc and dominated by Mexican bank
lenders whose relationships with the borrower are often laden with conflicts
of interest. 22 This lack of a sophisticated legal framework governing outof-court restructurings allows some creditors, specifically the powerful
Mexican banks, to gain an advantage not shared by the foreign
bondholders.2 3
A good example is the recently announced restructuring by Grupo
Sidek, S.A. de C.V. ("Grupo Sidek"). On April 2, 1996, Grupo Sidek
announced the details of a restructuring plan reached with the seventeen
member Mexican bank group which controls approximately seventy percent
of the company's outstanding debt.2 As has become typical in Mexico, the
agreement was negotiated by a steering committee for the Mexican bank
group, while the foreign debtholders, who own approximately $570 million
(U.S.) of Grupo Sidek bonds, were not represented in the negotiations.2 5
The situation is exacerbated by the potential conflicts of interest that
arise because of the close relationship between Grupo Sidek and many of
these banks. Grupo Sidek's Chief Executive, for instance, is a board
member of Grupo Financiero Banamex-Accival ("Banacci"), the bank that
led the restructuring negotiations.2 6 Banacci also holds an equity stake in
a Grupo Sidek tourism subsidiary and two Banacci co-chairmen have

20. Darrow, supra note 1, at 119.
21. Torres, supra note 10.
22. Id.
23. Id. "An out-of-court restructuring in the U.S. usually incorporates the concerns of
all creditors. The lack of a specific legal framework for out-of-court restructures in
Mexico sometimes results in some creditors being treated more advantageously than
others." Id. (quoting Agustin Berdeja, Managing Partner of Berdeja & Associados, a
Mexican law firm).
24. Grupo Sidek Presents Major Elements of Debt Restructuring Proposal, PR
ASS'N, April 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News/Curnws File
[hereinafter Restructuring Proposal].

NEWSWIRE

25. Id.; Torres, supra note 10.
26. Torres, supra note 10.
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served as Grupo Sidek directors. Finally, Eduardo Robinson Bours, the
mediator in charge of the Grupo Sidek refinancing, has several potential
conflicts of interest: his family owns shares in Mexican banks that are
Grupo Sidek creditors, his uncle is a Grupo Sidek board member and his
family has invested in various real estate projects with Grupo Sidek
subsidiaries.2 8
Grupo Sidek's restructuring plan divides existing creditors into four
categories. Category I includes the aforementioned group of Mexican
banks. Category II includes secured debt collateralized by assets currently
generating significant cash flow. Category III includes all remaining
secured debt up to the value of its underlying collateral and unsecured debt
of subsidiaries which have no secured debt. Category IV includes the
under-secured portion of the secured debt included in Category III and all
other unsecured debt. 29 Holders of each category of debt will be offered
new securities of Grupo Sidek in exchange for existing debt.30
Creditors in Category I will be offered four-year United States dollardenominated secured notes with a floating rate of interest estimated to be
equal to LIBOR 3 ' plus 700 basis points.32 Creditors in Category IV,
including foreign Eurobond holders, will be offered United States dollardenominated unsecured mandatorily exchangeable notes. These notes
accrue no interest during the eighteen months after the restructuring, bear
interest at LIBOR plus 700 basis points during months eighteen through
thirty following the restructuring and after month thirty are mandatorily
exchanged for common stock of Grupo Sidek at prices to be agreed upon
in the future.33
Foreign creditors are angered not only by the disparate treatment
among debt categories, but also by their subordination to the Mexican
banks with respect to assets held by a Grupo Sidek steel subsidiary, Grupo
Simec. 34 Grupo Simec owns many valuable assets which Eurobondholders
expected to be a part of the pool of assets available to repay their debt in
the event of liquidation or restructuring. Instead, in 1995 Grupo Sidek

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Restructuring Proposal,supra note 24.
30. Id.

31. London Interbank Offered Rate. See THOMAS P. FITCH, DICTIONARY OF BANKING
TERMS 365-66 (1990).
32. Restructuring Proposal, supra note 24.
33. Id.
34. Torres, supra note 10.
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used its ownership interest in Grupo Simec to guarantee a $170 million
(U.S.) emergency loan from the bank.group.35 As part of the restructuring
agreement, the banks will release the guarantee in exchange for a pledge
of Grupo Sidek's sixty-two percent equity interest in Grupo Simec.3 6
This disparate treatment between foreign creditors and Mexican bank
creditors is becoming a common problem in Mexico. In late 1995, for
example, Grupo Synkro, S.A. de C.V. ("Grupo Synkro") defaulted on
$347 million (U.S.) of debt, including $50 million (U.S.) of Eurobonds.3 7
In the subsequent restructuring-organized by Eduardo Robinson Bours,
who also mediated the Grupo Sidek restructuring-part of the bank loans
were exchanged for new loans indexed to Mexico's inflation rate and
Although the foreign
guaranteed by various Grupo Synkro assets.3
creditors shared ratably in the guarantees, the Eurobond debt was not
indexed.3 9 Thus, the principal on the bank loans rises with inflation
(estimated to be approximately thirty percent in 1996), using a larger part
of the guarantees, while the principal amount due on the Eurobonds
remains fixed.4 °
Foreign bondholders are attempting to protect their interests: ING
Barings Securities Inc., a Grupo Sidek Eurobondholder, is seeking to form
a committee of bondholders to demand better terms in the proposed
restructuring and several Grupo Sidek bondholders have filed suit in
federal district court in New York for alleged breaches of the debt
contract. 41 Nonetheless, foreign creditors of Mexican corporations can
expect large losses to continue until more efficient and modem bankruptcy
laws are developed in Mexico.

35. Id.
36. Restructuring Proposal,supra note 24.
37. Torres, supra note 10.

38. Id.
39. Id.

40. Id.
41. Id.

